Local Police Commissioner?

By Robert Vasquez

The need for a Commissioner of Police from outside Gibraltar is palpable. It is a view boosted by the Opinion Piece from former Commissioner of Police Louis Wink, “The Case for a Local Commissioner”. Mr Wink’s own arguments counter the conclusion that a local appointee is best right now.

In the UK, the College of Policing, ‘Guidance for Appointing Chief Officers’ suggests that appointing a chief officer from another region “can bring benefits through exchanging experience of policing in other areas and understanding of other operating environments …”

What greater encouragement to do that does Gibraltar need, especially following on from the ongoing McGrail situation?

There is no certainty that a local will bring “a deep understanding of Gibraltar’s legal framework, cultural idiosyncrasies, and social dynamics”, as Mr Wink argues, especially now that many non-Gibraltarians have joined the RGP.

Moreover the “legal framework” is defined in laws, and understanding can be and is gained quickly by those with the necessary experience.

There is also little basis to suggest that a “local appointee … will be better positioned to implement … changes effectively and transparently.” Any needed changes will be spelt out in the McGrail Inquiry report and transparency will be obvious.

Public confidence is fostered through leadership not community “connection”. The latter often results in criticism due to subjective decisions based on favouritism.

The considerations outlined by Mr Wink are mostly subjective and should be avoided by any new Police Commissioner. He/she should apply law and order objectively. An external appointment, without any local connections or biases, will help that.

Policing and its leadership are currently under scrutiny in the McGrail Inquiry, as is the use of ‘influence’. We must await the report to weigh up its findings and conclusions, not assume as Mr Wink seems to do.

Any “significant reforms in policing structure, accountability, and community trust”, as Mr Wink says, may be best delivered by a non-local Police Commissioner, contrary to what he suggests.
Such an appointee will not be diverted by “… the nuances of Gibraltar’s unique law enforcement…”, which perhaps is what in the past has been at fault for elements of disregard for the objective application of the law.

A local appointee, as Mr Wink suggests, is not “especially critical as Gibraltar navigates the uncertain outcomes of the Brexit treaty negotiations…”. Law and order issues that may arise following any outcome of the Gibexit negotiation will have to be dealt with objectively in accordance with the applicable law.

Mr Wink believes that, in the event of a Gibexit ‘deal’, “… strong relationships and cultural sensitivity…” are necessary. Any person having the policing experience needed of a police commissioner will have that or be advised by those around him/her who are local, allowing an objective mind to determine matters.

If there is a ‘no deal’ Mr Wink suggests “increased border tensions, potential trade disruptions, and security challenges will demand swift, informed, and community focused responses, qualities that a local leader … can deliver effectively.” Surely each of those, including added local unrest, will require objective policing, which is what any chief officer is trained and experienced to deliver within the law.

Mr Wink then argues against himself, pointing out that “…someone from outside … could bring fresh perspectives and innovative practices … [offering] new approaches to long-standing challenges and help implement global best practices in policing … [invigorating] the RGP with a sense of modernisation and change.”

Those are the improvements needed in the RGP, especially following the McGrail Inquiry, whatever its outcome might be.

Facing “a steep learning curve” is not an argument against a non-local appointee, as Mr Wink argues. “Gibraltar’s unique social, cultural, and geopolitical environment”, as suggested by Mr Wink, are again subjective and partial considerations. Those have little impact on policing.

Policing must be the objective and impartial application of the law. Subjective issues are for courts to determine as appropriate.

A non-Gibraltar Police Commissioner will help also to repair damage done following recent prosecutions not having proceeded. It has left many with questions about the respective roles of the RGP and the prosecution service.

Mr Wink argues rightly that, “.… the insight of an external appointee could bring value …”. Surely, he/she would bring value, not that he suggests that “… familiarity, established trust, and commitment to Gibraltar’s specific needs, are far more compelling.”

Once again that is subjectivity overcoming the objectivity that the post needs.

It is a subjectivity emphasised by his immediately following sentence, “the RGP needs a leader who understands its people, its challenges, and its opportunities. A local appointee embodies these qualities, offering the stability, continuity, and culturally informed leadership that the RGP needs to navigate the future.”

His arguments that local mistrust due to bias or perceived bias based on close ties point to a non-local commissioner being appointed are powerful ones and defeat his subjectivity. But he dismisses that strong point subjectively, saying, “…these very connections can enhance trust, accountability, and effectiveness…” whilst failing to explain how.

Especially so, when objectivity is the essence of good policing. That, we are “… a small jurisdiction…” further weakens his argument.

He writes, “A local commissioner’s familiarity with the community does not necessarily equate to bias…”. The addition of the word “necessarily” is his admission that bias or perceived bias can be a problem, worsened by his observation that we are a closed knit community.

His point that “an appointee with established relationships and cultural awareness is better equipped to manage public expectations and address issues proactively” does not bear scrutiny. It is precisely that type of subjectivity which stokes adverse public expectations, criticisms, and undermines proactivity and trust.

Any “… clear codes of ethics, robust oversight mechanisms, and institutional accountability…” cannot “mitigate the risk of any perceived or actual bias.” It is individual behaviour and lack of being tainted by association, friendship, community involvement, connections, behaviour, and more that prevent bias.

Further, the issue is not one of alienating the community. It is one of ensuring that the job is done independently and objectively.

One can agree that “Ultimately, it is the leader’s professionalism, integrity, transparency and commitment to justice … that determine public confidence in impartiality”, but “the nature of their local ties…” can impact on that perception/reality.

Robert Vasquez, KC, is a retired barrister and political commentator. He stood as an independent candidate at the last general election on a platform of democratic reform.