Bills sets out powers for surveillance and interception of comms 

Draft legislation published by the Gibraltar Government would create a framework providing law enforcement agencies and other public authorities investigating serious crime with a range of investigatory powers, including intercepting communications and covert electronic surveillance. 

The Investigatory Powers Bill 2026 provides for a range of intrusive powers including interception of communication, acquisition of communications data, equipment interference, surveillance and decryption of protected information.  

It also provides oversight arrangements intended to strengthen the safeguards governing the use of those powers.  

The Bill, which runs to 164 pages and has yet to be debated in Parliament, also set outs an administrative arrangement stemming from the treaty to allow for cross-border “continued surveillance” under strict conditions. 

The Bill’s explanatory memorandum says it would place key powers on a statutory footing and create a “structured, privacy-centred, proportionate and accountable framework”. 

The legislation would be supported by statutory codes of practice for each of the main investigatory powers. 

Among the oversight measures is the appointment of an Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who would act as the main independent reviewer of how the powers are used, with particular attention to privacy safeguards. 

The Commissioner would be able to carry out investigations, inspections and audits, and would have powers to require documents, information and assistance from public authorities. 

The Commissioner would be appointed by the Governor, in consultation with the Chief Minister and acting on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission.  

The post holder must either have held high judicial office or be recommended by the Governor or the Chief Minister. 

The Commissioner would be required to produce an annual report to the Chief Minister covering statistics, the results and impact of the use of powers, safeguards relating to legal privilege and journalistic material, and error information. 

The Chief Minister would be required to publish that report and lay it before Parliament, although parts could be withheld on public interest or security grounds. 

The Bill also requires the Governor to appoint a competent authority, following the same process as for the Commissioner, to authorise the use of sensitive interception powers under the legislation. Some less intrusive powers could still be granted by the intercepting authority. 

The Bill would allow the interception of communications of the Chief Minister and elected MPs, but only under a targeted interception authorisation regime and with additional approvals on top of the ordinary authorisation process. 

Interception of communications to or from the Chief Minister would require the approval of the Deputy Chief Minister. 

Any interception targeting a Government minister or the Speaker of Parliament would require the approval of the Chief Minister. 

For targeted interceptions involving non-executive elected MPs, the approval of the Speaker of Parliament would be required in addition to the ordinary authorisation. 

CROSSBORDER ‘CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE’ 

The draft legislation includes a schedule containing an administrative arrangement stemming from the treaty, setting out the conditions for “continued surveillance” between Gibraltar and Spain. 

In practice, it would allow a Gibraltar officer to continue a surveillance operation in Spain, and vice versa, but only under strict operating rules. 

Such continued surveillance would only be allowed in respect of specified serious crimes such as terrorism, murder and other violent offences, organised crime, sexual exploitation of children, money laundering and kidnapping, among others. 

Any officer entering the other territory would have to notify the local authorities before entering, and local authorities can take over the operation. 

Officers would have to comply with local law and be able to prove they were acting officially.  

They would not be allowed to enter homes or places not accessible to the public.  

They could carry weapons unless the local authorities requested otherwise but could only use them in legitimate self-defence. 

Officers continuing surveillance in the neighbouring territory would not be able to arrest the person under surveillance, and every operation would have to be fully reported to the competent authorities. 

They would also have to assist with any investigation or judicial proceedings if requested.